What political factors explain the selection of countries for preferential trade agreements by the European Union? I argue that when forming a trade agreement the EU is more likely to target countries that have a higher degree of political and economic transparency than other developing countries. In highly transparent countries the EU is able to monitor effectively whether or not these countries follow its forms of conditionality, which is the main rationale of EU regionalism. Moreover, economic and political transparency plays a particularly important role in determining the degree of flexibility in trade agreements. Evidence based on data from 138 developing countries supports these arguments.
Introduction
What political factors explain a decision by the European Union to enter into a preferential trade agreement with a developing country? The European Union (EU) 1 has been central to the proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in the current wave of "new regionalism" (Mansfield and Milner, 1999) .
2 For instance, of the 109 notifications of PTAs to the World Trade Organization as of 1 January 1995, no less than 76 were with the EU or between European partners (Pelkmans and Brenton, 1999) . This emphasis of the EU on PTAs has been explained in part by the fact that rather than being limited to trade policy, bilateral agreements serve as crucial instruments of the EU's foreign policy (Brenton and Manchin, 2003; Messerlin, 2001 ). Specifically, EU bilateralism is the principal tool through which the EU shapes the structure of the international system in general, and the political and economic systems of developing countries (Least Developed Countries) in particular.
However, this is just part of the story. From the perspective of LDCs, several studies emphasize that EU PTAs may also act as a tool of development (Woolcok, 2004; Whalley, 1998; Rodrik, 1989) . 3 Indeed, by joining a PTA with the EU, LDCs can gain access to one of the largest and richest markets, lock in political and economic reforms, and improve their competitiveness in the global economy. This combination of elements of foreign policy and development shows that the EU's selection of trade partners has crucial political implications.
Despite the magnitude of EU bilateralism and its importance for the international trade system, to date, most work on the topic has focused almost exclusively on economic drivers, such as economic size and the level of economic development of LDCs (Pelkmans and Brenton, 1999) . A number of recent studies on the EU has explored the role of key interest groups in the formation of PTAs (Aggarwal and Fogarty, 2007; Bechtel and Tosun, 2009; Dür, 2007) . However, from the perspective of governance, the EU uses PTAs to push LDCs to implement political and economic reforms (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004) . If conditionality is not effective due to enforcement problems, EU PTAs are lacking as instruments of foreign policy and as tools of development. A vast body of literature (Koremenos et al., 2001; Rosendorff and Milner, 2001; Svolik, 2006) suggests that cooperation problems may be mitigated by states' domestic features and by the design of the agreement. Accordingly, the EU's decision to pursue PTAs is affected not only by internal factors, such as the political conflict among interest groups in Brussels, but also by domestic features of LDCs that in turn influence the design of EU bilateralism. As EU Trade Commissioner Mandelson has noted, the EU must construct ambitious bilateral trade agreements with "carefully chosen partners" (2006: 2) .
Focusing on the role of domestic institutions, I empirically address the rationale for EU bilateralism. Using a political economy perspective, I argue that political and economic transparency in an LDC affects both the probability of securing a PTA with the EU and the design of the trade agreement. First, it influences PTA formation because high transparency makes it easier for the EU to monitor the fulfillment of the agreement. Second, it affects the design of the PTAs by leading to a high incidence of discretionary provisions, allowing the EU to correctly identify causes of deviation on the part of LDCs. To investigate these two dependent variables, i.e. (Putnam, 1988) and opportunism, transparency significantly increases the probability of designing flexible agreements.
Background EU regionalism and Conditionality in Trade Policies
The new wave of regionalism features arrangements that involve not only the reduction of barriers and what is generally defined as merchandise trade, but also arrangements that regulate trade-related areas. Agreements on issues such as services, investment, intellectual property, and temporary movement of labor are becoming common in PTAs. In this regard, the EU has been the most important driver of this new kind of agreement. In a broad sense, the EU offers access to its large markets for goods in exchange for access to service markets in LDCs, the LDCs' acceptance of rules governing investment and intellectual property rights, and their improvement 4 of human rights (Global Economic Prospect, World Bank, 2005) . In the literature this is known as a conditional agreement. Examples of conditionality include the Copenhagen conditions, in which the EU required former communist countries to achieve stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, human rights, and minority rights, to create a functioning market economy, and to cope with competitive pressure and market forces (Grabbe, 1999 ) and the Barcelona Process, which set the rules of the economic cooperation between the EU and the Mediterranean countries (Baert, 2003) .
Despite the well-known importance of economic factors, e.g. reaping benefits from economies of scale and reducing transaction costs (Mattli, 1999) , as recent studies have pointed out (Maur, 2005; McQueen, 2002; Holland, 2002) , political conditionality has become one of the key issues between the EU and LDCs. The EU demands greater accountability by having the LDCs adopt of a series of related principles that are then evaluated by the EU, such as good governance, democracy, human rights, and a free market (Holland, 2002: 112) . Conditionality can be categorized in several ways: by political and economic aspects; internal and external supervision; and positive and negative sanctions. Political conditionality remunerates the implementation of policy in an LDC that promotes the goals of democracy, human rights, and good governance. Economic conditionality links rewards with the adoption and promotion of specific microeconomic and macroeconomic policies, such as structural adjustment programs and liberation. Typically, both political and economic conditionality are intensively monitored by the EU (Holland, 2002: 119) .
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Positive and negative forms of conditionality entail added benefits for adhering to specific policy guidelines or the threat of disciplinary sanctions in the event that such guidelines are flouted.
The underlying rationale for the EU using political and economic conditionality in negotiating bilateral trade agreements with LDCs has three facets. First, the EU aims to promote its rules with the partner country, dictating a hegemonic harmonization of regulatory policies (Lawrence, 1996) . As the former EC Trade
Commissioner Pascal Lamy (2004) put it, "we always use bilateral trade agreements to move things beyond WTO standards. By definition, a bilateral trade agreement is WTO-plus." In other words, the EU exports its own designed policies to gain bargaining power vis-à-vis the US at a multilateral level, e.g. in a WTO round.
Second, by exporting its own regulatory standards, the EU strengthens the international competitiveness of its firms. Specifically, the application of EU regulations by an LDC creates a competitive advantage for European producers, making it more difficult for other producers, e.g. US producers, to sell their products. Third, the EU aims to stabilize individually unsettled neighbors by connecting them more closely to the European bloc, and to encourage regional stability through integration (Maur, 2005 (Maur, : 1578 . Good governance, for instance, has become a fundamental prerequisite for sustainable development (Holland, 2002: 121) .
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Despite some limitations on the choice of their own domestic policies, LDCs reap several benefits from concluding a trade agreement with the EU. First, and most importantly, forming a bilateral trade agreement with the EU enhances an LDC's policy credibility (Whalley, 1998) . According to Schiff and Winters, "entering a PTA entails political sunk costs, and if it requires liberal or sound policies to make sense, entry provides the government with a signal device, for only a government with liberal intentions would sign " (2003: 111) . Thus, in the presence of asymmetric information about the government, a PTA with the EU can improve credibility.
Although the benefits of North-South PTAs are still a matter of debate among scholars, there is a wide consensus that by signing these agreements LDCs bolster their reputation in the global economy and send a positive signal to investors and companies (Ethier, 1998; Rodrik, 1989) . Moreover, Maur (2005 Maur ( : 1578 argues that improving their existing regulatory framework using the EU template helps LDCs to correct market failures. Finally, according to McQueen (2002 McQueen ( : 1383 , an agreement with the EU can significantly lower transaction costs and uncertainty through the presence of a regulatory framework. These benefits apply not only to relations with the EU, but also with the rest of the world.
Increasing policy credibility and political and economic certainty and decreasing transaction costs are necessary conditions to attract investment and multinational corporations. In turn, attracting foreign capital and foreign companies allows LDCs access to knowledge, markets, and networks. In particular, financial support and technical assistance may bolster reforms resulting in a further improvement of credibility and political and economic certainty. Indeed, recent studies (Medvedev, 2006; Velde and Bezemer, 2004; Globerman, 2002; Chakrabarti, 2001) circumstances where product and factor prices adjust immediately and resources can be reallocated without cost, the optimal policy would be the simultaneous removal of all distortions. However, in reality things are more complicated. Indeed, resources cannot be reallocated instantaneously without incurring costs in different sectors of the economy (Nsouli et al., 2005: 741) . Moreover, different markets adjust to policy changes and price signals at different speeds. For instance, the response of the production structure, investment, and ownership patterns to economic reforms 8 tends to be much slower than the response to financial policies and reforms in such areas as privatization, tax, and trade.
There are several adjustment costs that an economy may face due to conditionalitydriven reforms. First, since labor and capital are sector specific and thus not readily transferable between sectors, economic reforms may generate short-term costs in terms of unemployment and income distribution (Little et al., 1970; Gavin, 1996) .
Second, when the budgetary cost of reforms is high, as may be expected when an LDC wants to honor EU economic conditionality, a reform process may result in inflationary pressure (Dewatripont and Roland, 1992; . Third, there is a general consensus that trade liberalization may lead to loss of government revenues, which are an important part of an LDC's budget, as trade taxes are reduced or eliminated (Baunsgaard and Keen, 2005) . In turn, to maintain macroeconomic stability and to avoid a severe imbalance of payment, governments may be forced to cut social security and welfare or to raise taxes (Ebrill et al., 1999) . Thus, in this scenario, the majority of the population may show a status quo bias that makes reforms unfeasible at both political and economic levels. Ghesquiere, 1998). In turn, groups that face major economic losses are likely to be highly mobilized against economic reforms that threaten their interests. 
Transparency and Flexibility in EU Trade

Credible Commitments and Transparency
Forming a PTA is consistent with the logic of a two-stage cooperation problem.
As several authors argue (Fearon, 1998; Bearce, 2003) , the decision to form an agreement and the decision to fulfill an agreement are strongly connected. If the EU anticipates that impediments to monitoring and enforcing an agreement would make a cooperative agreement unstable, it has a low incentive to negotiate (Fearon, 1998: 279) , and thus such a cooperative agreement is unlikely to be formed (Leeds, 1999) .
In other words, in relation to the formation of an agreement with the EU, LDCs face a classic time-inconsistency problem that, in turn, undermines the credibility of LDCs' commitments. Indeed, in line with LDCs' previously described preferences, time-inconsistent policies would lead to higher utility than time-consistent policies.
Specifically, LDCs turn to the EU seeking to gain credibility in the international economic system. In exchange, they offer the promise of some domestic reforms.
EU conditionality ensures that reforms are implemented despite the temptation to postpone these reforms or to forego them altogether.
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Since an LDC has this incentive to renege upon a PTA, the EU must have instruments to detect and sanction opportunistic behavior. As a large body of cooperation literature claims, monitoring is as necessary and important as sanctioning, since "applying the proper sanctioning strategy is difficult when compliance is difficult to monitor" (Morrow, 1994: 387) . More specifically, in the absence of the capability to monitor and sanction, commitments would not be credible and the EU would have no incentive to reach an agreement with an LDC. I argue that transparency in economic and political institutions can provide the necessary monitoring and enforcement functions. When the political and economic system is transparent, governments will face greater difficulties hiding their actions and avoiding the cost of opportunism. Moreover, when a government's preferences are unveiled by transparent political institutions, commitments may be credible even in the presence of time-inconsistency problems (Broz, 2002) . Finally, transparency in governments'
actions is an effective way to bolster the reputation of LDCs, which is crucial in the case of time-inconsistency problems (Rodrik, 1992) . Hence, the first hypothesis can be stated as follows:
H1: The probability of the EU and an LDC forming a PTA increases with the political and economic transparency of the LDC.
Flexibility
As explained above, in implementing the conditionality dictated by the EU, LDCs face adjustment costs that increase uncertainty and distributional problems at the domestic level. In turn, uncertainty and distributional concerns increase the strength of the support for protection at home. I argue that uncertainty is particularly high in cases of EU bilateralism, since these PTAs are tightly linked to the implementation of important economic and political reforms. A recent body of literature (Fearon 1998; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; Kucik and Reinhardt, 2008) emphasizes the uncertainty that states face about the future costs of compliance in a repeated-game context. In line with these works, I claim that uncertainty may endanger the prospects for a bilateral trade agreement in the present, despite the fact that potential benefits are high for both actors.
To overcome this problem, almost every international agreement allows members the opportunity to temporarily escape contractual commitments without incurring excessive retaliation from other partners or without being compelled to renegotiate costs once they have been forced to withdraw from the agreement. These escape clauses are often referred to as flexibility provisions. According to Rosendorff and Milner (2001: 830) , flexibility is "any provision of an international agreement that allows a country to suspend the concessions it previously negotiated without violating or abrogating the terms of the agreement." As such, flexibility may encourage states to enter into cooperative agreements and sustain those commitments over time (Kucik and Reinhardt, 2008) . Efficient breach clauses are also crucial in the case of EU bilateralism. Specifically, flexibility allows for the sustaining of cooperation under circumstances when defection by LDCs' governments is necessitated by excessively high costs of compliance.
There are two main provisions that are used in trade agreements to allow flexibility: anti-dumping protection and, more importantly, safeguard clauses. 5 The problem with flexibility is that domestic politics constitute private information, as do domestic political changes. Thus, there exists an incentive for LDCs to misrepresent their private information in order to achieve a more favorable outcome in the bargaining process with the EU. If the EU perceives that monitoring the domestic politics of an LDC would not be feasible or would be too expensive, it will not allow the inclusion of the flexibility clauses in the agreement in the first place. Indeed, the higher the political and economic transparency of the LDC, the lower the asymmetries of information are and, in turn, the more the LDC is credibly capable of communicating about "exceptional circumstances" that may occur domestically to undermine its capacity for compliance. This follows naturally from Bayesian updating, as the sources of any given defection can be seen as coming from either forced emergency measures or opportunism, and is in line with previous studies in the field (Pelc, 2009; Svolik, 2006) . Hence, the second hypothesis can be formulated as follows:
H2: The degree of flexibility of a PTA between the EU and an LDC increases 14 with the political and economic transparency of the LDC.
Empirical Analysis: Models and Case Selection
In the previous sections, EU bilateralism has been described as a process of selection related to domestic institutional features of LDCs. Due to this selection character of the causal mechanism, some estimation problems occur. Specifically, flexibility is observable if and only if a PTA is signed, thereby generating a selection bias problem. In order to deal with these issues and to test the previous hypotheses, I
use the following specification of Heckman selection model known as the HECKIT model (Grier et al., 1994; Heckman, 1979) . on (the inverse of) the distance variable (Manger, 2005) . A positive coefficient would indicate that countries are indeed driven to seek preferential agreements if their neighbors are doing so to avoid the trade diversion effect (Baldwin, 1997; Grossman and Helpman, 1995; Haggard, 1997; Hirschman, 1981) . I label this variable Spatial
PTA.
6 Moreover, α, β 1 , and β 2 are vectors of parameters, and ε 1 and ε 2 are i.i.d.
error terms with a constant mean and finite variance.
Outcome Equation
The dependent variable (DV) of the outcome equation is the variable PTA Flexibility ij,t .
Since the operationalization of flexibility is intrinsically problematic, this variable is specified using two different indices. Although I acknowledge the difficulties in pro- is the value of economic growth of the LDC i at time t-1. This variable captures whether an LDC is risk-adverse, which has proved to be an important variable in explaining flexibility (Koremenos, 2005) . Specifically, countries that experience low economic growth are supposed to be more risk-acceptant than countries that experience an economic upturn. The argument is that leaders who anticipate losing office due to economic downturn are more likely to implement adventurous policies.
Trade ij,t−1 is the log of the value of exports from the EU to the LDC i and from the LDC to the EU in year t − 1 in constant (t + n) dollars. 
Selection Equation
The dependent variable of the selection equation is a dichotomous variable. Specif- Agreements between the EU and Kazakhstan (2005) and between the EU and Russia (2006) . These two agreements contain only very general statements on the need to strengthen economic cooperation between the parties and no binding provisions.
Moreover, these agreements include "only" 12 articles that are less than one third of the shortest free trade area treaty signed by the EU, i.e. the PTA with Lebanon.
I end up with 23 preferential trade agreements signed between 1990 and 2005.
Even in the case of the Selection Equation, the main independent variables are variables that measure political and economic transparency as described in the previous section. I include several control variables that prove to be important drivers of PTA formation in general, i.e. not specific to EU bilateralism. Regarding economic control variables, GDP i,t−1 measures the GDP of the LDC i in year t − 1.
This variable captures the idea that the larger the market of an LDC, the higher is the benefit for the EU in joining a PTA (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004) . Trade ij,t−1 has been previously described. As trade between the EU and an LDC increases, the traditional trade gains from tariffs removal increases for the EU and LDCs.
Regarding the political variables, Alliance ij,t−1 scores 1 if country i is an ally of at least one EU member at time t − 1; 0 otherwise. This variable controls for the possibility that the EU signs a PTA with an LDC for foreign policy reasons (Gowa, 1994) . As already said, former colonies have often maintained close ties with the colonizer and this is expected to make the formation of a PTA more likely. I include both Other-Than-French Colony i and French Colony i , which are both expected to have a positive coefficient. Moreover, since members of the WTO tend to have similar trade policies and similar legal provisions in terms of trade law, e.g. adoption of anti-dumping provisions, an LDC i that is a WTO members at time t-1 should be more likely to conclude an agreement with the EU. I label this variable WTO i,t .
Furthermore, previous research has shown that democratic pairs of countries tend to sign more PTAs than non-democratic or mixed pairs (Mansfield et al.) . Thus, I
include the variable Democracy also in the Selection Equation. Finally, the rationale for including US PTA i,t−1 is that the EU may react to a PTA signed by the US with an LDC, e.g. Mexico, to avoid losing trade with this country (Dür, 2007) or to push its own regulatory standard in the international system (Drezner, 2007) .
Regarding geographical factors, Distance ij measures the log of distance in kilometres between Brussels and the capital of the LDC i. Indeed, several authors (Krugman, 1991; Baier and Bergstrand, 2004) claim that the formation of PTAs is more likely between countries that are geographically proximate. Mirroring the theoretical framework, the empirical analysis follows a two-stage process. In the first stage, I endogenize the EU's decision to select an LDC using the level political and economic transparency as the main explanatory variable. The estimated probability of selection is then used as a regressor in the second stage for analysing the impact of political and economic transparency on the degree of flexibility included in the trade agreement. The previously outlined causal mechanism implies that political and economic transparency allows LDCs to bargain for more flexible PTAs with EU. However, since the degree of flexibility of a PTA has an impact upon the probability of its being signed, excluding countries that do not have a PTA with the EU would cause a severe estimation bias that might lead to incorrect 23 inferences. The econometric logic of the Heckman model allows conditioning the estimated mean function in the second stage on the selection process of first stage.
Moreover, it takes into account that for an LDC the probability of being selected by the EU affects the likelihood of signing a PTA that includes flexibility provisions.
Furthermore, to account for the duration dependence of the dependent variable in the selection model, natural cubic splines (with three knots) are included. For the sake of conciseness, splines are not reported in the econometric analysis. Finally, since the data set is a panel, to control for potential heteroskedasticity across countries, the robust Huber-White sandwich estimator is employed.
As mentioned above, the model is tested for a large number of countries. 
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Empirical Findings
As previously stated, the first stage of the Heckman model tests whether or not
LDCs form a PTA with EU, analyzing the universe of cases. Results for the two specifications of PTA flexibility are very similar. In both cases, all three operationalizations support the argument that high political and economic transparency of an LDC increases the probability of forming a PTA with the EU with the coefficients having the right sign and being statistically significant at the .01 levels (see Table 1 and Table 2 ). Moreover, with the exception of Other-Than-French Colony the sign of all the control variables, which are statistically significant in the models, is in line with previous studies, giving added plausibility to the findings. The negative sign of
Other-Than-French Colony is driven by East European countries, which were party to half of the PTAs under investigation and, are not former EU colonies. Since in the probit model the value of the coefficients is not meaningful, looking exclusively at the sign and the significance of the coefficient does not allow us to know the effect of the main explanatory variables on the probability of forming a PTA. Thus, the predicted probabilities are showed in Table 3 10 In addition, the magnitude of these results is comparable to (and in fact, higher than) the impact of other important control variables, such as Trade, Democracy, and WTO (Table 3) . 2 Broadly speaking, a preferential trade agreement is an arrangement that liberalizes trade between members. Here, the term "preferential trade agreement" and the term "bilateral trade agreement" are used synonymously.
3 Using the World Bank classification, I define low-income economies and middle-income economies as LDCs.
4 It may be argued that is more harmful to an LDC's reputation to not honor an agreement than to not sign it in the first instance. However, empirical evidence does not support this argument. Several studies (Steunenberg and Dimitrova, 2007; Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003) show 30 that despite a strong wave of North-South agreements, there is a mixed record on compliance with such agreements. These findings seem to imply that LDCs prefer to secure North-South PTAs and to obtain the "seal of approval" from developed economies, especially the EU and the US, though they are not always ready to honor every clause of these agreements. 
